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Executive Summary 
Database security is a growing concern evidenced by an increase in the number of reported inci-
dents of loss of or unauthorized exposure to sensitive data. As the amount of data collected, re-
tained and shared electronically expands, so does the need to understand database security. The 
Defense Information Systems Agency of the US Department of Defense (2004), in its Database 
Security Technical Implementation Guide, states that database security should provide controlled, 
protected access to the contents of a database as well as preserve the integrity, consistency, and 
overall quality of the data. Students in the computing disciplines must develop an understanding 
of the issues and challenges related to database security and must be able to identify possible so-
lutions. 
At its core, database security strives to insure that only authenticated users perform authorized 
activities at authorized times. While database security incorporates a wide array of security top-
ics, notwithstanding, physical security, network security, encryption and authentication, this pa-
per focuses on the concepts and mechanisms particular to securing data. Within that context, da-
tabase security encompasses three constructs: confidentiality or protection of data from unauthor-
ized disclosure, integrity or prevention from unauthorized data access, and availability or the 
identification of and recovery from hardware and software errors or malicious activity resulting in 
the denial of data availability. 
In the computing discipline curricula, database security is often included as a topic in an introduc-
tory database or introductory computer security course. This paper presents a set of sub-topics 
that might be included in a database security component of such a course. Mapping to the three 
constructs of data security, these topics include access control, application access, vulnerability, 
inference, and auditing mechanisms. Access control is the process by which rights and privileges 
are assigned to users and database objects. Application access addresses the need to assign appro-
priate access rights to external applications requiring a database connection. Vulnerability refers 
to weaknesses that allow malicious users to exploit resources. Inference refers to the use of le-
gitimate data to infer unknown information without having rights to directly retrieve that informa-
tion. Database auditing tracks database access and user activity providing a way to identify 
breaches that have occurred so that corrective action might be taken. 
As the knowledge base related to data-
base security continues to grow, so do 
the challenges of effectively conveying 
the material. This paper addresses those 
challenges by incorporating a set of in-
teractive software modules into each 
sub-topic. These modules are part of an 
animated database courseware project 
designed to support the teaching of da-
tabase concepts. The courseware covers 
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the domains of Database Design, Structured Query Language, Database Transactions, and Data-
base Security. The Security Module, presented in this paper, allows students to explore such areas 
as access control, SQL injections, database inference, database auditing, and security matrices. 
The courseware was developed as part of a National Science Foundation grant and has been made 
freely available at http://adbc.kennesaw.edu  
Keywords: database security, data integrity, database courseware, database vulnerability, access 
control. 
Introduction 
Database technologies are a core component of many computing systems. They allow data to be 
retained and shared electronically and the amount of data contained in these systems continues to 
grow at an exponential rate. So does the need to insure the integrity of the data and secure the 
data from unintended access. The Privacy Rights Clearing House (2010) reports that more than 
345 million customer records have been lost or stolen since 2005 when they began tracking data 
breach incidents, and the Ponemon Institute reports the average cost of a data breach has risen to 
$202 per customer record (Ponemon, 2009). In August 2009, criminal indictments were handed 
down in the United States to three perpetrators accused of carrying out the single largest data se-
curity breach recorded to date. These hackers allegedly stole over 130 million credit and debit 
card numbers by exploiting a well known database vulnerability, a SQL injection (Phifer, 2010). 
The Verizon Business Risk Team, who have been reporting data breach statistics since 2004, ex-
amined 90 breaches during the 2008 calendar year. They reported that more than 285 million re-
cords had been compromised, a number exceeding the combined total from all prior years of 
study (Baker et al., 2009). Their findings provide insight into who commits these acts and how 
they occur. Consistently, they have found that most data breaches originate from external sources, 
with 75% of the incidents coming from outside the organization as compared to 20% coming 
from inside. They also report that 91% of the compromised records were linked to organized 
criminal groups. Further, they cite that the majority of breaches result from hacking and malware 
often facilitated by errors committed by the victim, i.e., the database owner. Unauthorized access 
and SQL injection were found to be the two most common forms of hacking, an interesting find-
ing given that both of these exploits are well known and often preventable. Given the increasing 
number of beaches to database systems, there is a corresponding need to increase awareness of 
how to properly protect and monitor database systems. 
At its core, database security strives to insure that only authenticated users perform authorized 
activities at authorized times. It includes the system, processes, and procedures that protect a da-
tabase from unintended activity. The Defense Information Systems Agency of the US Department 
of Defense (2004), in its Database Security Technical Implementation Guide, states that database 
security should provide “controlled, protected access to the contents of your database and, in the 
process, preserve the integrity, consistency, and overall quality of your data” (p. 9). The goal is 
simple, the path to achieving the goal, a bit more complex. Traditionally database security fo-
cused on user authentication and managing user privileges to database objects (Guimaraes, 2006). 
This has proven to be inadequate given the growing number of successful database hacking inci-
dents and the increase in the number of organizations reporting loss of sensitive data. A more 
comprehensive view of database security is needed, and it is becoming imperative for students in 
the computing disciplines to develop an understanding of the issues and challenges related to da-
tabase security and to identify possible solutions. 
Database security is often included as a topic in an introductory database course or introductory 
computer security course. However as the knowledge base related to database security continues 
to grow, so do the challenges of effectively conveying the material. Further, many topics related 
to database security are complex and require students to engage in active learning to fully com-
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prehend the fundamental nature of database security issues. This paper presents a set of sub-
topics for inclusion in a database security component of a course. These sub-topics are illustrated 
using a set of interactive software modules.  
As part of a National Science Foundation Course, Curriculum and Laboratory Improvement 
Grant (#0717707), a set of interactive software modules, referred to as Animated Database 
Courseware (ADbC) has been developed to support the teaching of database concepts. The 
courseware has been made freely available and may be accessed at http://adbc.kennesaw.edu. 
ADbC consists of over 100 animations and tutorials categorized into four main modules (Data-
base Design, Structured Query Language [SQL], Transactions and Security) and several sub-
modules. Interactive instructional materials such as animations can often be incorporated into the 
instructional process to enhance and enrich the standard presentation of important concepts. An-
imations have been found to increase student motivation, and visualizations have been found to 
help students develop understanding of abstract concepts which are otherwise considered to be 
‘invisible’ (Steinke, Huk, & Floto, 2003). Further, software animations can be effective at rein-
forcing topics introduced in the classroom as they provide a venue for practice and feedback. 
Specifically, the Security module and corresponding sub-modules will be covered in this paper. 
These sub-modules cover six areas: access control, row level security, application security as por-
trayed in a security matrix, SQL injections, database inference, and database auditing. 
Database Security Topics 
The following presents an organizational structure for presenting database security concepts in a 
course in which database security is one of many topics. As such the focus is limited and material 
introductory. While database security incorporates a wide array of security topics, notwithstand-
ing, physical security, network security, encryption and authentication, this paper focuses on the 
concepts and mechanisms particular to securing data. Database security is built upon a framework 
encompassing three constructs: confidentiality, integrity and availability (Bertino & Sandhu, 
2005). Confidentiality or secrecy refers to the protection of data against unauthorized disclosure, 
integrity refers to the prevention of unauthorized and improper data modification, and availability 
refers to the prevention and recovery from hardware and software errors as well as from mali-
cious data access resulting in the denial of data availability (Bertino, Byun & Kamra, 2007). 
Mapping to these three constructs, a database security component in any course needs to cover 
access control, application access, vulnerability, inference, and auditing mechanisms. 
Access Control 
The primary method used to protect data is limiting access to the data. This can be done through 
authentication, authorization, and access control. These three mechanisms are distinctly different 
but usually used in combination with a focus on access control for granularity in assigning rights 
to specific objects and users. For instance, most database systems use some form of authentica-
tion, such as username and password, to restrict access to the system. Further, most users are au-
thorized or assigned defined privileges to specific resources. Access control further refines the 
process by assigning rights and privileges to specific data objects and data sets. Within a data-
base, these objects usually include tables, views, rows, and columns. For instance, StudentA may 
be given login rights to the University database with authorization privileges of a student user 
which include read-only privileges for the Course_ Listing data table. Through this granular level 
of access control, students may be given the ability to browse course offerings but not to peruse 
grades assigned to their classmates. Many students, today, inherently understand the need for 
granularity in granting access when framed in terms of granting ‘friends’ access to their Facebook 
site. Limiting access to database objects can be demonstrated through the Grant/Revoke access 
control mechanism. 
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Access control – Grant/revoke 
Access control is a core concept in security. Access control limits actions on objects to specific 
users. In database security, objects pertain to data objects such as tables and columns as well as 
SQL objects such as views and stored procedures. Data actions include read (select), insert, up-
date, and delete or execute for stored procedures. For instance a faculty member, Dr. Smith, may 
be given read privileges to the Student table. 
Generally, access control is defined in three ways: Mandatory Access Control (MAC), Discre-
tionary Access Control (DAC), and Role Based Access Control (RBAC). MAC and DAC provide 
privileges to specified users or groups to which users are assigned. MAC rules are system applied 
and considered static and more secure. An example MAC rule would be giving Dr. Smith read 
access to the Student table. DAC rules are user supplied, considered dynamic and content fo-
cused. An example DAC rule would be giving Dr. Smith read access to the Student table but only 
for students enrolled in a specific course such as ‘Introduction to Security.’ Dr. Smith would not 
be able to select student data for students enrolled in other courses. MAC and DAC provide pow-
erful tools but Role Based Access Control proves to be especially effective for database systems. 
Roles are analogous to job functions. With roles, the focus is on identifying operations and the 
objects to which those operations need access. Users assigned to a role automatically receive its 
associated privileges. For instance Dr. Smith may be assigned to the role of Faculty. Faculty 
members are given rights to read the Students table, obtain course enrollment data, and update 
grades for students assigned to their courses. By being assigned to the Faculty role, Dr. Smith is 
implicitly given these privileges. 
Identifying users and assessing their processing and data access needs is a major undertaking in 
establishing good database security protocols. Identifying and defining roles and correctly grant-
ing access rights to actions and objects and then appropriately assigning users to those roles is the 
crux of the process. Once a role has been created, the format for implementing RBAC follows the 
pattern: 
GRANT privilege_name 
 ON object_name 
 TO role_name; 
Privilege_name identifies the rights to be granted. These include such rights as selecting data, 
modifying data, or manipulating the database structure. ON identifies the database objects and 
TO identifies the roles to which those privileges are applied. For instance, if Dr. Smith was as-
signed the role of Faculty and Faculty were given read rights to the Student table, the RBAC rule 
would be: 
 GRANT Select 
 ON Student_Table 
 TO Faculty; 
The Access Control sub-module on the ADbC site introduces the concept of access control and 
provides two examples for granting and revoking privileges. The introduction explains the proc-
ess and models its implementation through corresponding SQL statements. Example one uses a 
student scenario and example two uses a faculty scenario. The grant sub-module steps through the 
process of assigning users to roles and assigning privileges to those roles. For example, using the 
faculty scenario, the steps for granting role authorization to individual users include having a da-
tabase administrator create the role of faculty, assigning faculty to this role, and then assigning 
specific rights or privileges to database objects. After being assigned to the role of Faculty, the 
user has all privileges assigned to that role. Figure 1 depicts the step in the process where indi-
viduals are assigned to the Faculty role. 
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Figure 1. ADbC Access Control Sub-module: Example Granting Role Authorization 
 
The revoke sub-module steps through the process of revoking rights and removing users from 
role authorization. For example, using the faculty scenario, the steps for revoking role authoriza-
tion to individual users include revoking privileges to specific database objects and removing in-
dividual users from pre-defined roles. In the case depicted in Figure 2, privileges to the Faculty 
Figure 2. ADbC Access Control Sub-module: Example Revoking Role-based Privileges  
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table are removed from the Faculty role. Once the privileges are revoked, members of the Faculty 
role will not be able to access data in the Faculty table. Figure 2 depicts the step in the process 
where privileges to the Faculty table are revoked from the pre-defined role of Faculty. 
Syntactically, creating roles and implementing RBAC is fairly straightforward. The challenge is 
the management of users and their associated roles (Jaquith, 2007). Entitlement management in-
cludes not only identifying appropriate roles and their respective rights but continuous manage-
ment of granted entitlements. The general security rule is to assign the most restrictive set of 
privileges required to complete authorized tasks. However, constructing the organizational struc-
ture for a RBAC system can quickly become complex, and the fact that users frequently change 
roles means that RBAC requires constant monitoring. In his book, Security Metrics: Replacing 
Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt, Jaquith (2007) states, “Today's information security battleground 
is all about entitlements – who’s got them, whether they were granted properly, and how to en-
force them” (p.117). Being able to assess access control techniques is critical to student under-
standing of database security. 
Row level security 
Controlling access to database tables or columns is frequently required and can be enacted by 
simply granting privileges to one of these objects. Restricting access to data contained in individ-
ual records (rows) requires additional steps. For instance, a student should only be able to view or 
modify the row or rows of data that correspond specifically to him or her. However, implementa-
tion of row level security cannot be done in the same manner as access control is applied to data-
base objects such as tables. This is because the selection of a row is based on the evaluation of 
specific data values. Therefore, a common way to implement row level security is through the use 
of SQL Views. A View can be constructed that executes a select statement which returns speci-
fied rows of data evaluated against a specific value, such as the current user. For instance, the 
following SQL view would return only the row of data in which the value of the AttributeName 
column matched the user’s id: 
CREATE VIEW View_Name AS 
   SELECT * 
    FROM Table_name 
    WHERE AttributeName = USER; 
The ADbC site provides a sub-module, entitled Row Level Security, that demonstrates this con-
cept. A data window is presented showing table data and the SQL code for creating a View that 
returns row level data restricted to the name of the user. The ‘Code’ button displays all associated 
steps and SQL code needed for creating the table, users, and View and for assigning access rights 
to that View. Students can experiment with the row level security mechanism by choosing a user-
name from the associated dropdown box. An output window displays the results of the execution 
of the View given the selections made by the user. As the username is modified, a different row is 
displayed in the output window. Figure 3 shows that when username ‘Jones’ is selected, only data 
related to this user is displayed. 
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Figure 3: ADbC Row Level Security Sub-module: Example Implementation using a SQL View  
 
Row level security, although difficult to implement, is an important database security concept. It 
allows for the restriction of access to data in tables in which data related to many different users is 
stored. It would be inefficient to store each student at a university in a separate database; it is also 
inappropriate to give students access to all of the data in a centralized student table. Students 
should be made aware of the trade-offs that have to be made to implement row level security. As 
an advanced topic in this area, students can be directed to study Oracle’s Virtual Private Database 
solution to applying security policies as a way to enact row level security (Knox, 2004). 
Application Access Assessment  
Most users do not access a database by directly logging into the database system. Instead they 
access the database through an application program. A simple tool, known as a security (or 
CRUD) matrix can be used to explicitly identify the required access rights needed by an applica-
tion program. Specifically, the security matrix provides a visual depiction of the correlation be-
tween the operations or authorizations needed for database objects and input/output sources such 
as forms and reports. Operations depicted in a security matrix include Select, Create (insert), Up-
date, and Delete. The top row of the matrix lists database table objects. Application programs are 
listed in the left-most column. The letters C, R, U, D are placed in intersecting cells to identify the 
type of access required by a particular program. Any given cell may contain any combination of 
these letters or none at all. An empty cell denotes that a program does not need access to the in-
tersecting table. Conversely, a cell with all four letters, CRUD, needs full access to the table. 
A Security Matrix as shown in the ADbC Security Matrix sub-module is presented in Figure 4. A 
customer-order scenario is depicted. Seven tables are listed across the top. Seven forms are listed 
down the left-hand side. Scanning the matrix left to right shows that the Order Form requires ac-
cess to five tables including modification rights to three of them. Specifically the Order Form 
needs only read access to the Customers and Employees tables, requires read, insert, update, and 
delete rights to the Order_Details and Orders table, and requires read and update rights to the 
Products table. Scanning top to bottom shows that three applications, Customer Labels, Customer 
Information, and Order Form, access the Customers table. The Customer Labels and Orders Form 
require read access to the Customers table while the Customer Information form requires read, 
insert, update, and delete rights. The Security Matrix sub-module includes an accompanying set 
of interactive questions that ask users to identify relationships between the tables and the applica-
tion programs.  
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Figure 4: ADbC Security Matrix Sub-module: Example Security Matrix 
Another advantage to the security matrix is that it visually depicts rules of integrity. For instance, 
the matrix makes it easy to identify all application programs potentially affected by any change 
made to a database table. For example, a column deleted from the Products table will impact the 
Orders form and Products form, possibly generating an error when these applications are exe-
cuted. Before such a change is made, its subsequent impact must be assessed to ascertain what 
applications will need updates. In summary, the security matrix is a simple, yet effective, tool for 
identifying needed security permissions to database objects. 
Database Vulnerability 
Security breaches are an increasing phenomenon. As more and more databases are made accessi-
ble via the Internet and web-based applications, their exposure to security threats will rise. The 
objective is to reduce susceptibility to these threats. Perhaps the most publicized database applica-
tion vulnerability has been the SQL injection. SQL injections provide excellent examples for dis-
cussing security as they embody one of the most important database security issues, risks inherent 
to non-validated user input. SQL injections can happen when SQL statements are dynamically 
created using user input. The threat occurs when users enter malicious code that ‘tricks’ the data-
base into executing unintended commands. The vulnerability occurs primarily because of the fea-
tures of the SQL language that allow such things as embedding comments using double hyphens 
(- -), concatenating SQL statements separated by semicolons, and the ability to query metadata 
from database data dictionaries. The solution to stopping an SQL injection is input validation. 
A common example depicts what might occur when a login process is employed on a web page 
that validates a username and password against data retained in a relational database. The web 
page provides input forms for user entry of text data. The user-supplied text is used to dynami-
cally create a SQL statement to search the database for matching records. The intention is that 
valid username and password combinations would be authenticated and the user permitted access 
to the system. Invalid username and passwords would not be authenticated. However, if a disin-
genuous user enters malicious text, they could, in essence, gain access to data to which they have 
no privilege. For instance, the following string, ' OR 1=1 --  entered into the username textbox 
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gains access to the system without having to know either a valid username or password. This 
hack works because the application generates a dynamic query that is formed by concatenating 
fixed strings with the values entered by the user.  
For example, the model SQL code might be: 
 SELECT Count(*) FROM UsersTable  
  WHERE UserName = ‘contents of username textbox’  
  AND Password = ‘contents of password textbox’; 
When a user enters a valid username, such as ‘Mary’ and a password of ‘qwerty’, the SQL query 
becomes: 
 SELECT Count(*) FROM UsersTable  
  WHERE UserName=‘Mary’  
  AND Password=‘qwerty’; 
However, if a user enters the following as a username:  ‘OR 1=1 --  the SQL query becomes: 
 SELECT Count(*) FROM UsersTable  
  WHERE UserName=‘‘ OR 1=1 - -’  
  AND Password=‘‘; 
The expression 1 = 1 is true for every row in the table causing the OR clause to return a value of 
true. The double hyphens comment out the rest of the SQL query string. This query will return a 
count greater than zero, assuming there is at least one row in the users table, resulting in what 
appears to be a successful login. In fact, it is not. Access to the system was successful without a 
user having to know either a username or password.   
Another SQL injection is made possible when a database system allows for the processing of 
stacked queries. Stacked queries are the execution of more than one SQL query in a single func-
tion call from an application program. In this case, one string is passed to the database system 
with multiple queries, each separated by a semicolon. The following example demonstrates a 
stacked query. The original intent is to allow the user to select attributes of products retained in a 
Products table. The user injects a stacked query incorporating an additional SQL query that also 
deletes the Customers table. 
 SELECT * FROM PRODUCTS; DROP CUSTOMERS;  
This string when passed as an SQL query will result in the execution of two queries. A listing of 
all information for all products will be returned. In addition the Customers table will be removed 
from the database. The table structure will be deleted and all customer data will be lost. In data-
base systems that do not allow stacked queries, or invalidate SQL strings containing a semicolon, 
this query would not be executed. 
The ADbC courseware sub-module for SQL injections demonstrates the insertion of malicious 
code during the login process. The sub-module steps through the process by first showing the en-
try of valid data and then demonstrating entry of malicious code, how it is injected into a dynami-
cally created SQL statement and then executed. Figure 5 shows the step where malicious code is 
entered. Figure 6 shows the dynamically created SQL command and the resulting display of all 
the data in the user table. Additional steps present code resulting in the modification or deletion 
of data. 
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Figure 5: ADbC SQL Injection Sub-Module: Entering Malicious Code in a SQL Injection  
 
 
Figure 6: ADbC SQL Injection Sub-Module: Result of SQL Injection using Malicious Code  
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SQL injection vulnerabilities result from the dynamic creation of SQL queries in application pro-
grams that access a database system. The SQL queries are built incorporating user input and 
passed to the database system as a string variable. SQL injections can be prevented by validating 
user input. Three approaches are commonly used to address query string validation: using a black 
list, using a white list, or implementing parameterized queries. The black list parses the input 
string comparing each character to a predefined list of non-allowed characters. The disadvantage 
to using a black list is that many special characters can be legitimate but will be rejected using 
this approach. The common example is the use of the apostrophe in a last name such as O’Hare. 
The white list approach is similar except that each character is compared to a list of allowable 
characters. The approach is preferred but special considerations have to be made when validating 
the single quote. Parameterized queries use internally defined parameters to fill in a previously 
prepared SQL statement. The importance of input validation cannot be overstated. It is one of the 
primary defense mechanisms for preventing database vulnerabilities including SQL injections. 
Database Inference 
A subtle vulnerability found within database technologies is inference, or the ability to derive un-
known information based on retrieved information. The problem with inference is that there are 
no ideal solutions to the problem. The only recommended solutions include controls related to 
queries (suppression) or controls related to individual items in a database (concealing). In other 
words, sensitive data requested in a query are either not provided or answers given are close but 
not exact, preventing the user from obtaining enough information to make inferences. Neither of 
these represents ideal solutions as they are restrictive in nature. However, it is important for stu-
dents to understand the risks of inference and how it might occur. Examples are the best way to 
demonstrate inference. The ADbC inference sub-module includes three animations that demon-
strate how users might be able to put together (infer) information when data is available to those 
with a higher security access level or when they are only given access to aggregate data. 
Inference often happens in cases where the actual intent is for users to generate or view aggregate 
values when they have not been given access to individual data items. However, because they are 
exposed to information about the data, they are sometimes able to infer individual data values. 
Take for example a scenario where a worker desires to find out their co-worker Goldberg’s sal-
ary. In this organization, salary data is confidential. The worker has rights to generate aggregate 
data such as summarizing organizational salary data averaged across specific criteria (i.e., salary 
averaged by gender). Although the worker does not have access to individual data items, he or 
she does possess particular and unique details about Goldberg; specifically that Goldberg is a fe-
male and has 11 dependents. Based on this information, the worker can derive an aggregate func-
tion such as SELECT AVG (Salary) FROM EMPLOYEES WHERE Gender = “F” and Depend-
ents = 11. This will return Goldberg’s salary because the average is taken from an aggregated 
data set of one. The ADbC inference sub-module animation for this scenario is illustrated in Fig-
ure 7. The SQL-command window depicts the construction of the requested query to ascertain 
salary averages. Employees Table data is shown in the upper left and underneath is the result of 
the query. 
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Figure 7. ADbC Inference Sub-module: Using Aggregate Data to Infer Information 
 
Inference can also occur when users are able to ascertain information from data accessible to 
them at their security level even though that specific information is protected at a higher security 
access level. It is difficult to explain this without the aid of a demonstration. The second example 
in the ADbC Inference sub-module provides a scenario where specific data, in this case company 
product prototype data, is not made accessible to junior employees. However, junior employees 
are given access to update the Storage table that tracks the contents in company storage areas. 
When perusing this table, the junior employee is not able to read any rows containing prototype 
products. The problem occurs if the employee tries to update a protected row. This triggers an 
error message. Based on the error message, the junior employee could surmise that information 
was being hidden and might infer that something of a secretive nature was being stored in the 
storage compartment referenced in the update request. Figure 8 depicts an error being generated 
when a junior employee issues a query against a protected row of data. The table on the top right 
shows all of the data contained in the Storage table. The table on the bottom shows the data ac-
cessible to junior employees. Notice that Compartment B containing ProductX is not displayed in 
the lower table. A possible solution to this inference problem is polyinstantiation. Polyinstantia-
tion allows a database to retain multiple records having the same primary key; they are uniquely 
distinguished by a security level identifier. If polyinstantiation were enacted in the proceeding 
scenario, the insert would be successful. However, this does not prevent the ‘double booking’ of 
the storage compartment area. 
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Figure 8. ADbC Inference Sub-module: Security Level Access Error Leading to Inference 
 
Developing technological solutions to detecting database inference is complex. Much of the work 
done in this area involves revoking access to specific database objects based on a user’s past que-
rying history (Staddon, 2003). The problem with inference detection, especially when done at 
query processing time, is that it results in a significant delay between the time the query is exe-
cuted and the results are presented. As with other approaches to mitigating database security vul-
nerabilities, trade-offs must be made. The protection of highly sensitive data requires an examina-
tion of what situations could lead to exposure to unauthorized users and what monitoring policies 
should be implemented to insure appropriate responses are enacted. 
Auditing 
Database auditing is used to track database access and user activity. Auditing can be used to iden-
tify who accessed database objects, what actions were performed, and what data was changed. 
Database auditing does not prevent security breaches, but it does provide a way to identify if 
breaches have occurred. Common categories of database auditing include monitoring database 
access attempts, Data Control Language (DCL) activities, Data Definition Language (DDL) ac-
tivities, and Data Manipulation Language (DML) activities (Yang, 2009). Monitoring access at-
tempts includes retaining information on successful and unsuccessful logon and logoff attempts. 
DCL audits record changes to user and role privileges, user additions, and user deletions. DDL 
audits record changes to the database schema such as changes to table structure or attribute data-
types. DML audits record changes to data. In addition, database errors should be monitored 
(Yang, 2009). Database auditing is implemented via log files and audit tables.  
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The real challenge of database auditing is deciding what and how much data to retain and how 
long to keep it. Several options exist. A basic audit trail usually captures user access, system re-
sources used, and changes made to the structure of a database. More complete auditing captures 
data reads as well as data modifications. The ADbC auditing sub-module provides step-by-step 
examples for creating audits of user sessions, changes to database structure, and modifications to 
data. Figure 9 shows an example of code required to implement and trigger an audit of a user 
login. Data recorded includes the username and the date and time of the user login and logoff. 
 
Figure 9. ADbC Database Audit Sub-module: Monitoring User Logins 
An audit trail provides a more complete trace recording of not only user access but also user ac-
tions. This type of facility is included with many database management systems. The most com-
mon items that are audited include login attempts, data read and data modifications operations, 
unsuccessful attempts to access database tables, and attempts to insert data that violates specific 
constraints. Figure 10 shows an example audit trail of user access and user actions as demon-
strated in the Audit Command animation in the ADbC Database Audit sub-module. The SQL 
Commands window displays the SQL statement used to retrieve data from the audit table. 
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Figure 10. ADbC Database Audit Sub-module: Example Database Audit Trail 
 
Auditing plays a central role in a comprehensive database security plan. The primary weakness of 
the audit process is the time delay between when data is recorded and when analysis is per-
formed. Consequently, breaches and other unauthorized activities are identified after the fact, 
making it difficult to mitigate adverse effects in a timely manner. However, solutions are being 
introduced that allow for real-time monitoring of database activity looking for patterned events 
indicative of potential breaches and enacting real-time notification to database administrators 
when such actions occur. Whatever the case, database auditing is a necessary process, and stu-
dents must be made aware of the need for continuous monitoring of database log files. 
ADbC Courseware Use and Evaluation 
The ADbC courseware was developed to provide supplemental instructional support in the class-
room. The software is not tailored to any specific product or textbook nor is it intended to substi-
tute for these resources. Instead it provides another venue for student interaction and engagement 
with course material. The ADbC components support both in-class instruction and out-of-class 
practice and reinforcement. They were not designed to be the sole source for learning a new con-
cept. In the classroom, faculty may use the courseware for demonstration when explaining a top-
ic. The sub-modules can also be assigned as out-of-class activities to reinforce concepts presented 
in class. Most of the sub-modules include more than one animation allowing for one example to 
be demonstrated in class and another example to be assigned for out of class practice. Students 
may also be referred to the courseware for assistance when completing homework assignments or 
studying for exams. 
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An evaluation of student perceptions of the teaching effectiveness of the Security Module was 
undertaken in the spring of 2009. Sixty students were asked to complete an online questionnaire. 
Thirty-eight students responded. In addition, interviews were conducted with three faculty mem-
bers using the courseware in their classes. Students responding to the survey were asked to assess 
if a particular sub-module (access control, SQL injections, security matrix, row level security, 
database inference, and database auditing) helped them to learn the material. The majority of stu-
dents indicated that they agreed or strongly agreed that the sub-modules did enhance their learn-
ing. Sub-modules with the highest rating included SQL injections and row level security. Data-
base inference and database auditing received the highest number of students reporting a rating of 
‘neutral.’ When asked when they were motivated to use the software, 41% indicated they only 
used it when specifically requested to do so by their instructor. However, 51% reported they also 
used it on their own. Eight percent indicated they used the software often. The most common rea-
son given for using the software was to complete homework assignments or study for exams.   
Faculty reported that their teaching was enhanced by the courseware, citing that the courseware 
mapped well to the concepts taught in class, that it provided a means of reinforcement for student 
learning, and that it was a much better process for presenting the concepts than the traditional 
way of drawing pictures on a whiteboard. This evaluation was limited in scope to a relatively 
small number of students and faculty. However, the results are encouraging. Both students and 
faculty reported positive benefits to using the courseware. 
Conclusion 
The need to secure computer systems is well understood and securing data must be part of an 
overall computer security plan. Growing amounts of sensitive data are being retained in databases 
and more of these databases are being made accessible via the Internet. As more data is made 
available electronically, it can be assumed that threats and vulnerabilities to the integrity of that 
data will increase as well. Database security is becoming an increasingly important topic and stu-
dents need to develop core understandings in this area. The primary objectives of database secu-
rity are to prevent unauthorized access to data, prevent unauthorized tampering or modification of 
data, and to insure that data remains available when needed. 
The concepts related to database security are multifaceted. This makes it challenging to teach the 
material when database security is included as just one component of a larger course. However, 
this is how most students are exposed to the topic. This paper suggested a set of sub-topics in a 
database security course component and introduced a set of interactive software modules mapped 
to each sub-topic presented. Engaging students in interactive learning activities enhances the 
learning experience and provides the opportunity for students to further explore database security 
issues and identify practical implementation methods to database security mechanisms and strate-
gies. 
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